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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
V.
AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC.
How Do You Get CleanerAir?
David P. Primack*
In what may be the most important case on the Supreme Court's docket for the upcoming
term, the Court will decide the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) ability to determine clean air
standards for the country. For most of us, the importance of this case lies in the battle between
environmentalists and industry, between cleaner air and corporate ruin. For legal academics, the case
presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to revisit the "nondelegation doctrine," and to
reconsider the allocation of authority by Congress to administrative agencies. Even states themselves
have taken sides on this case, with the Northeastern states, feeling the effects of the emissions from the
Midwest factories, filing briefs on behalf of the EPA, and the industrial Midwestern states filing briefs
on behalf of the Trucking Associations. Obviously, the Supreme Court's decision will have a far-
reaching impact on the nature of business and the environment in this country.
In July 1997, the EPA issued final rules revising its primary and secondary national ambient air
quality standards (NAAQS), which it was required to do under the Clean Air Act. These revised
standards, inter alia, required the states to reduce their ozone levels from 0.12 parts per million (ppm) to
0.08 ppm and, in addition, to regulate soot (tiny particulate matter) down to 2.5 microns. EPA
contended that these new regulations will allow millions of Americans to breathe easier and save an
estimated 15,000 lives a year from the reduced respiratory ailments. Claiming that these standards
would impose an enormous cost on industry and states that is not proportional to health benefits
gained, the trucking industry and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed a petition to prevent the
promulgation of these rules. Agreeing with the petitioners, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit struck down these 1997 revised standards as unconstitutional.
In its 2-1 panel decision, the D.C. Circuit relied primarily on the nondelegation doctrine to hold
the EPA regulation unconstitutional. A court last used this doctrine, which basically states that
Congress may not delegate its lawmaking duties under the Constitution to other branches of
government without violating the principle of separation of powers, in 1935 to invalidate two New
Deal programs. Since the court-packing scheme of President Roosevelt, the courts have granted great
deference to regulatory agency interpretations of their broad Congressional mandates. The Clean
Water Act reflects one such broad mandate. The language of 5109 of the Act requires the EPA to
publish air quality standards, "the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the
Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect
the public health." Other agencies, such as the FCC and OSHA, have arguably broader mandates than
EPA's, so the Supreme Court's decision in this case may have momentous consequences for the entire
administrative state.
In their reasoning, the panel majority relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States (1928) which delineated the nondelegation doctrine and stated,
"[i]f Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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of legislative power." It is precisely because the EPA lacked an "intelligible principle" when it decided
to change the ozone and soot standards that the D.C. Circuit found their action to be an
unconstitutional delegation of Congressional lawmaking powers. Noting that the EPA could choose
ozone levels from zero ppm to the very high levels that occurred during the London Killer Fog of 1952
(which led to 4000 excess deaths in a week), the majority stated, "the agency rightly recognizes that the
question is one of degree, but offers no intelligible principle by which to identify a stopping point."
Judge David Tatel dissented, arguing that the majority's decision "ignores the last half-century
of Supreme Court nondelegation jurisprudence, apparently viewing these permissive precedents as mere
exceptions to the rule laid down 64 years ago...."
One issue in the case is the relevance of "cost-benefit analysis" in devising EPA standards.
Previous D.C. Circuit decisions have held that the Clean Water Act prohibits cost-benefit analysis as a
basis to create standards. The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari on precisely this question of
cost-benefit analysis on another appeal filed by the industry, which the Court has consolidated with this
case.
Through all of these technical concerns of "particulate matter levels" and "nonattainment
areas", the Supreme Court will have to decide how the EPA, and perhaps all administrative agencies,
must go about analyzing their broad mandates from Congress. Whereas Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia have in the past hinted that agencies have usurped too much
power from Congress. Justice Stephen Breyer has also considered the issue of administrative agency
power in a 1993 book, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Efective Risk Regulation. In his book, Justice
Breyer argued that agencies should employ a better cost-benefit analysis when making their decisions.
This case may bring the most important administrative law decision of the past decade.
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99-1257 Browner v. American Trucking Ass'ns Inc.
&
99-1426 American Trucking Associations Inc. v. Browner
First ruling below (D.C. Cir., 175 F.3d 1027, 67 U.S.L.W. 1695, 48 Envt. Rep. Cas. 1417):
Environmental Protection Agency's construction of Clean Air Act sections governing establishment of
air quality standards for ozone and particulate matter lacks "intelligible principle" for channeling factors
EPA uses to determine degree of impact of various levels of pollutants on public health and thus
effects unconstitutional delegation of legislative power; EPA had authority under Clean Air Act to
revise ambient air quality standard for ozone, but it may not enforce revised standard in areas that have
yet to attain prior standard because, although statute's requirements do not prevent redesignation of
areas based on their compliance with revised standard, they do limit agency's authority to enforce that
standard.
Second ruling below (D.C. Cit., 195 F.3d 4,49 Envt. Rep. Cas. 1391):
Federal appeals court had jurisdiction to review revised national ambient air quality standards for ozone
set by EPA under Clean Air Act, because, even though agency claimed standard was not final agency
action subject to judicial review until after it was implemented, revised standard reflected final,
unambiguous agency position on its authority to implement standard and imposed concrete obligations
on state regulators; court will not reconsider decision holding that EPA interpretation of Clean Air Act
in setting NAAQS for ozone and particulates violated nondelegation doctrine, because court based its
decision on agency's failure to articulate intelligible principle for limiting its discretion to set standards
at levels necessary to protect public health and, even though agency claims in rehearing position that
Section 109 of Clean Air Act provides limits that agency used to set standards, agency failed to raise
those arguments at proper time.
Questions presented: (1) Does Section 109 of Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409, as interpreted by EPA
in setting revised NAAQS for ozone and particulate matter, effect unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power? (2) Did court of appeals exceed its jurisdiction by reviewing, as final agency action
that is ripe for review, EPA's preliminary preamble statements on scope of agency's authority to
implement revised "eight-hour" ozone NAAQS? (3) Do provisions of 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments specifically aimed at achieving long-delayed attainment of then-existing ozone NAAQS
restrict EPA's general authority under other provisions of Clean Air Act to implement new and more
protective ozone NAAQS until prior standard is attained?
Question presented: Does Clean Air Act require that EPA must, in setting nationwide air quality
standards, ignore all factors "other than health effects relating to pollutants in the air," given that
consideration of such factors would permit both agency and reviewing courts to avoid confronting
constitutional nondelegation issues?
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AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
V.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
RESPONDENT
United States Court of Appeals
For the District of Columbia Circuit
May 14, 1999, Decided
PER CURIAM:
Introduction
The Clean Air Act requires EPA to
promulgate and periodically revise national
ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") for
each air pollutant identified by the agency as
meeting certain statutory criteria. See Clean Air
Act § § 108-09, 42 U.S.C. f f 7408-09. For
each pollutant, EPA sets a "primary standard"--
a concentration level "requisite to protect the
public health" with an "adequate margin of
safety"--and a "secondary standard"--a level
"requisite to protect the public welfare." ***
In July 1997 EPA issued final rules revising
the primary and secondary NAAQS for
particulate matter ("PM") and ozone. ***
In Part I we find that the construction of
the Clean Air Act on which EPA relied in
promulgating the NAAQS at issue here effects
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 ("All
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States."). We
remand the cases for EPA to develop a
construction of the act that satisfies this
constitutional requirement.
In Part II we reject the following claims:
that § 109(d) of the Act allows EPA to consider
costs; that EPA should have considered the
environmental damage likely to result from the
NAAQS' financial impact on the Abandoned
Mine Reclamation Fund; that the NAAQS
revisions violated the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA"), Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act ("UMRA"),
Flexibility Act ("RFA").
and Regulatory
In Part III we decide two ozone-specific
statutory issues, holding that the 1990 revisions
to the Clean Air Act limit EPA's ability to
enforce new ozone NAAQS and that EPA
cannot ignore the possible health benefits of
ozone.
I. Delegation
Certain "Small Business Petitioners" argue
in each case that EPA has construed § § 108 &
109 of the Clean Air Act so loosely as to render
them unconstitutional delegations of legislative
power. We agree. Although the factors EPA
uses in determining the degree of public health
concern associated with different levels of
ozone and PM are reasonable, EPA appears to
have articulated no "intelligible principle" to
channel its application of these factors; nor is
one apparent from the statute. The
nondelegation doctrine requires such a
principle. *** Here it is as though Congress
commanded EPA to select "big guys," and
EPA announced that it would evaluate
candidates based on height and weight, but
revealed no cut-off point. The announcement,
though sensible in what it does say, is fatally
incomplete. The reasonable person responds,
"How tall? How heavy?"
EPA regards ozone definitely, and PM
likely, as nonthreshold pollutants, i.e., ones that
have some possibility of some adverse health
impact (however slight) at any exposure level
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above zero. *** For convenience, we refer to
both as non-threshold pollutants; the
indeterminacy of PM's status does not affect
EPA's analysis, or ours.
Thus the only concentration for ozone and
PM that is utterly risk-free, in the sense of
direct health impacts, is zero. Section 109(b)(1)
says that EPA must set each standard at the
level "requisite to protect the public health"
with an "adequate margin of safety." *** These
are also the criteria by which EPA must
determine whether a revision to existing
NAAQS is appropriate. *** For EPA to pick
any non-zero level it must explain the degree of
imperfection permitted. The factors that EPA
has elected to examine for this purpose in
themselves pose no inherent nondelegation
problem. But what EPA lacks is any
determinate criterion for drawing lines. It has
failed to state intelligibly how much is too
much.
We begin with the criteria EPA has
announced for assessing health effects in
setting the NAAQS for non-threshold
pollutants. They are "the nature and severity of
the health effects involved, the size of the
sensitive population(s) at risk, the types of
health information available, and the kind and
degree of uncertainties that must be addressed."
*** Although these criteria, so stated, are a bit
vague, they do focus the inquiry on pollution's
effects on public health. And most of the
vagueness in the abstract formulation melts
away as EPA applies the criteria: EPA basically
considers severity of effect, certainty of effect,
and size of population affected. These criteria,
long ago approved by the judiciary, see Lead
Industries Ass'n v. EPA, 208 U.S. App. D.C 1,
647 F.2d 1130, 1161 (D.C Cir. 1980) ('Lead
Industries'), do not themselves speak to the issue
of degree.
Read in light of these factors, EPA's
explanations for its decisions amount to
assertions that a less stringent standard would
allow the relevant pollutant to inflict a greater
quantum of harm on public health, and that a
more stringent standard would result in less
harm. Such arguments only support the
intuitive proposition that more pollution will
not benefit public health, not that keeping
pollution at or below any particular level is
"requisite" or not requisite to "protect the
public health" with an "adequate margin of
safety," the formula set out by § 109(b)(1).
Consider EPA's defense of the 0.08 ppm
level of the ozone NAAQS. EPA explains that
its choice is superior to retaining the existing
level, 0.09 ppm, because more people are
exposed to more serious effects at 0.09 than at
0.08. *** In defending the decision not to go
down to 0.07, EPA never contradicts the
intuitive proposition, confirmed by data in its
Staff Paper, that reducing the standard to that
level would bring about comparable changes.
In other words, effects are less certain and
less severe at lower levels of exposure. This
seems to be nothing more than a statement that
lower exposure levels are associated with lower
risk to public health. The dissent argues that in
setting the standard at 0.08, EPA relied on
evidence that health effects occurring below
that level are "transient and reversible," ***
evidently assuming that those at higher levels
are not. But the EPA language quoted above
does not make the categorical distinction the
dissent says it does, and it is far from apparent
that any health effects existing above the level
are permanent or irreversible.
EPA frequently defends a decision not to
set a standard at a lower level on the basis that
there is greater uncertainty that health effects
exist at lower levels than the level of the
standard. *** And such an argument is likely
implicit in its defense of the coarse PM
standards. *** The dissent's defense of the fine
particulate matter standard cites exactly such a
justification. See Dissent at 6 ("The Agency
explained that 'there is generally greatest statistical
confidence in observed associations ... for levels at
and above the mean concentration [in certain
studies]' ") (emphasis added in dissent). But the
increasing-uncertainty argument is helpful only
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if some principle reveals how much uncertainty
is too much. None does.
The arguments EPA offers here show only
that EPA is applying the stated factors and that
larger public health harms (including increased
probability of such harms) are, as expected,
associated with higher pollutant concentrations.
The principle EPA invokes for each increment
in stringency (such as for adopting the annual
coarse particulate matter standard that it chose
here)--that it is "possible, but not certain" that
health effects exist at that level, *** could as
easily, for any non-threshold pollutant, justify a
standard of zero. The same indeterminacy
prevails in EPA's decisions not to pick a still
more stringent level. For example, EPA's
reasons for not lowering the ozone standard
from 0.08 to 0.07 ppm--that "the more serious
effects ... are less certain" at the lower levels
and that the lower levels are "closer to peak
background levels," *** could also be employed
to justify a refusal to reduce levels below those
associated with London's "Killer Fog" of 1952.
In that calamity, very high PM levels (up to
2,500 Sg/m3) are believed to have led to 4,000
excess deaths in a week. Thus, the agency
rightly recognizes that the question is one of
degree, but offers no intelligible principle by
which to identify a stopping point.
The latitude EPA claims here seems even
broader than that OSHA asserted in International
Union, UAW v. OSIA ("Lockout/ Tagout I"), 291
U.S. App. D.C 51, 938 F.2d 1310, 1317 (D.C
Cir. 1991), which was to set a standard that
would reduce a substantial risk and that was not
infeasible. In that case, OSHA thought itself
free either to "do nothing at all" or to "require
precautions that take the industry to the brink
of ruin," with "all positions in between ...
evidently equally valid." *** Here, EPA's
freedom of movement between the poles is
equally unconstrained, but the poles are even
farther apart--the maximum stringency would
send industry not just to the brink of ruin but
hurtling over it, while the minimum stringency
may be close to doing nothing at all.
In Lockout/ Tagout I certain special
conditions that have justified an exceptionally
relaxed application of the nondelegation
doctrine were absent, *** and they are equally
absent here. The standards in question affect
the whole economy, requiring a "more precise"
delegation than would otherwise be the case
**** No "special theories" justifying vague
delegation such as the war powers of the
President or the sovereign attributes of the
delegatee have been or could be asserted. Nor
is there some inherent characteristic of the field
that bars development of a far more
determinate basis for decision. (This is not to
deny that there are difficulties; we consider
some below.)
EPA cites prior decisions of this Court
holding that when there is uncertainty about the
health effects of concentrations of a particular
pollutant within a particular range, EPA may
use its discretion to make the "policy judgment"
to set the standards at one point within the
relevant range rather than another. *** We
agree. But none of those panels addressed the
claim of undue delegation that we face here,
and accordingly had no occasion to ask EPA
for coherence (for a "principle," to use the
classic term) in making its "policy judgment."
The latter phrase is not, after all, a self-
sufficient justification for every refusal to define
limits.
It was suggested at oral argument that
EPA's vision of its discretion in application of §
109(b)(1) is no broader than that asserted by
OSHA after a remand by this court and upheld
by this court in International Union, UA W v.
OSHA ("Lockout/Tagout II"), 308 U.S. App.
D.C 368, 37 F.3d 665 (D.C Cir. 1994). But
there, in fact, OSHA allowed itself to set only
standards falling somewhere between maximum
feasible stringency and some "moderate"
departure from that level. *** As our prior
discussion should have indicated, here EPA's
formulation of its policy judgment leaves it free
to pick any point between zero and a hair
below the concentrations yielding London's
Killer Fog.
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Where (as here) statutory language and an
existing agency interpretation involve an
unconstitutional delegation of power, but an
interpretation without the constitutional
weakness is or may be available, our response is
not to strike down the statute but to give the
agency an opportunity to extract a determinate
standard on its own. *** Doing so serves at
least two of three basic rationales for the
nondelegation doctrine. If the agency develops
determinate, binding standards for itself, it is
less likely to exercise the delegated authority
arbitrarily. *** And such standards enhance the
likelihood that meaningful judicial review will
prove feasible. *** A remand of this sort of
course does not serve the third key function of
non-delegation doctrine, to "ensure[ ] to the
extent consistent with orderly governmental
administration that important choices of social
policy are made by Congress, the branch of our
Government most responsive to the popular
will[.]" *** The agency will make the
fundamental policy choices. But the remand
does ensure that the courts not hold
unconstitutional a statute that an agency, with
the application of its special expertise, could
salvage. In any event, we do not read current
Supreme Court cases as applying the strong
form of the nondelegation doctrine voiced in
Justice Rehnquist's concurrence. ***
What sorts of "intelligible principles" might
EPA adopt? Cost-benefit analysis, *** is not
available under decisions of this court. Our
cases read § 109(b)(1) as barring EPA from
considering any factor other than "health
effects relating to pollutants in the air." ***
In theory, EPA could make its criterion the
eradication of any hint of direct health risk.
This approach is certainly determinate enough,
but it appears that it would require the agency
to set the permissible levels of both pollutants
here at zero. No party here appears to advocate
this solution, and EPA appears to show no
inclination to adopt it.
EPA's past behavior suggests some
readiness to adopt standards that leave non-
zero residual risk. For example, it has employed
commonly used clinical criteria to determine
what qualifies as an adverse health effect. ***
On the issue of likelihood, for some purposes it
might be appropriate to use standards drawn
from other areas of the law, such as the familiar
"mote probable than not" criterion.
Of course a one-size-fits-all criterion of
probability would make little sense. There is no
reason why the same probability should govern
assessments of a risk of thousands of deaths as
against risks of a handful of people suffering
momentary shortness of breath. More generally,
all the relevant variables seem to range
continuously from high to low: the possible
effects of pollutants vary from death to
trivialities, and the size of the affected
population, the probability of an effect, and the
associated uncertainty range from "large"
numbers of persons with point estimates of
high probability, to small numbers and vague
ranges of probability. This does not seem
insurmountable. Everyday life compels us all to
make decisions balancing remote but severe
harms against a probability distribution of
benefits; people decide whether to proceed with
an operation that carries a 1/1000 possibility of
death, and (simplifying) a 90% chance of cure
and a 10% chance of no effect, and a certainty
of some short-term pain and nuisance. To be
sure, all that requires is a go/no-go decision,
while a serious effort at coherence under §
109(b)(1) would need to be more
comprehensive. For example, a range of
ailments short of death might need to be
assigned weights. Nonetheless, an agency
wielding the power over American life
possessed by EPA should be capable of
developing the rough equivalent of a generic
unit of harm that takes into account population
affected, severity and probability. *** Here, of
course, EPA may not consider cost, and indeed
may well find a completely different method for
securing reasonable coherence. Alternatively, if
EPA concludes that there is no principle
available, it can so report to the Congress, along
with such rationales as it has for the levels it
chose, and seek legislation ratifying its choice.
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We have discussed only the primary
standards. Because the secondary standards are
at least in part based on those, *** we also
remand the cases to the agency with regard to
the secondary standards as well, for further
consideration in light of this opinion.
II. Other General Claims
The petitioners and amici contend that the
EPA erroneously failed to consider a host of
factors in revising the PM and ozone NAAQS.
We reject each of these claims in turn.
A. Consideration of Cost in Revising
Standards As this court long ago made clear, in
setting NAAQS under § 109(b) of the Clean Air
Act, the EPA is not permitted to consider the
cost of implementing those standards. *** The
petitioners make four unsuccessful attempts to
distinguish LeadIndustries and its progeny.
First, the petitioners claim that in Lead
Industries we held only that the Clean Air Act
does not compel the EPA to consider the costs
of implementation in setting a NAAQS; on the
contrary, we held that the Act precludes the
EPA from doing so.
Third, though the petitioners are correct that in
Lead Industries we interpreted § 109(b), which
governs the setting of NAAQS, and not §
109(d), which governs the revising of NAAQS,
we can discern no legally relevant difference in
the two sections that would make Lead Industries
inapplicable to § 109(d). *** The petitioners
contend that consideration of costs is one
pertinent factor in determining whether
revision of a NAAQS is "appropriate," but this
argument ignores the clause immediately
following "appropriate," which incorporates §
109(b) and thereby affirmatively precludes
consideration of costs in revising NAAQS.
Section 108(b) *** does require the EPA to
provide the States with information on the cost
of implementing NAAQS, but the reference to
§ 108 does not permit consideration of costs in
setting NAAQS because it clearly relates back
to the requirement that the EPA "make ...
revisions in ["the criteria published under
section 7408"] ... as may be appropriate." And
insofar as the air quality criteria do apply to the
setting of NAAQS, they do so through §
109(b), which (again) precludes the
consideration of costs and which is explicitly
incorporated into § 109(d)(1). ***
Fourth, the petitioners point to § 109(d)(2),
which creates the CASAC and requires it to
advise the EPA about, among other things,
"any adverse public health, welfare, social,
economic, or energy effects which may result
from various strategies for attainment and
maintenance of such [NAAQS]." *** Why, ask
the petitioners, would the CASAC be required
to advise the EPA about these matters if the
EPA were not then supposed to consider its
advice in the course of revising the NAAQS?
As above, however, the petitioners overlook
that § 109(d)(1) directs the EPA to review and
to revise, as appropriate, the air quality
standards issued under § 108 as well as the
NAAQS promulgated under § 109(b). The
advice required in § 109(d)(2)(C)(iv) is pertinent
only to the EPA's duty under § 108 to provide
the States with control strategy information.
III. Oone
A. Subpart 2 and the Revised Ozone
Standard
In 1990 the Congress substantially revised
the Clean Air Act by, among other things,
adding specific enforcement provisions for
carbon monoxide, particulate matter, sulfur
oxides, nitrogen dioxide, lead, and as pertinent
here, ozone. Previously, the Act required that
all areas of the country not attaining the
primary ozone standard, no matter how far
from attainment, come into compliance "as
expeditiously as practicable but not later than
December 31, 1987." *** Many areas had not
attained the primary ozone NAAQS by that
date; some were still a long way from doing so.
The Congress responded to the continued
ozone problem by enacting a new enforcement
scheme, which it codified as Subpart 2 of Part
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D of the Clean Air Act, *** redesignating the
original provisions as Subpart 1.
Subpart 2 requires the EPA to classify
nonattainment areas based upon their design
value, which is a rough measure of whether an
area complies with the 0.12 ppm, 1-hour
primary ozone standard. *** Subpart 2 also
specifies, for each class of nonattainment areas,
both measures that the States must take to
reduce emissions of the chemicals that are
precursors of ozone and information that the
States must report to the EPA. *** In short,
Subpart 2 is the Congress's comprehensive plan
for reducing ozone levels throughout the
country.
The State and Non-State Petitioners, along
with Congressman Bliley appearing as an
amicus curiae, argue that Subpart 2 precludes
the EPA from revising the primary and
secondary ozone NAAQS. We reject this
argument (in Part III.A.1) insofar as it pertains
to the EPA's continued ability to promulgate a
revised ozone NAAQS or to designate areas as
not in attainment with a revised NAAQS. We
agree (in Part III.A.2) with those petitioners,
however, insofar as they maintain, based upon
the text and structure of Subparts 1 and 2, that
the EPA is precluded from enforcing a revised
primary ozone NAAQS other than in
accordance with the classifications, attainment
dates, and control measures et out in Subpart 2.
Further, we conclude (in Part III.A.3) that the
EPA may not require a State to comply with a
revised secondary ozone NAAQS in any area
that has yet to attain the 0.12 ppm primary
standard.
1. The EPA's Power to Revise the Ozone
NAAQS and Designate Areas as
Nonattainment
The 1990 amendments did not alter the
section of the Clean Air Act that provides for
setting and revising primary and secondary
NAAQS. *** The Administrator, therefore, still
must "at five-year intervals [from December 31,
1980] ... complete a thorough review of ... the
[NAAQS] promulgated under this section and
... make such revisions in such ... standards ... as
may be appropriate." *** The Second Circuit
held that this section continues to "set[] forth a
bright-line rule for agency action," *** and we
agree. Nothing in the Act modifies this "bright-
line rule" or otherwise makes it inapplicable to
revision of the ozone NAAQS.
To the extent that the 1990 amendments
shed any light upon this question, they suggest
that the EPA retains its authority to revise the
ozone NAAQS.
[We hold that the EPA retains the power
to designate areas as nonattainment under a
revised ozone NAAQS.
2. The EPA's Power to Enforce the
Revised Ozone Standard
That the enactment of Subpart 2 does not
alter the EPA's authority to revise the ozone
NAAQS or to designate areas as nonattainment
for ozone does not, however, compel the
conclusion that Subpart 2 has no effect upon
the EPA's authority to enforce a revised
primary ozone NAAQS. (We consider the
enforcement of secondary ozone NAAQS in
Part III.A.3, below.) In fact, the text and
structure of Subparts 1 and 2 suggest precisely
the opposite conclusion. After designating an
area as nonattainment under a NAAQS, the
EPA normally looks to Subpart 1 for authority
to "classify the area for the purpose of applying
an attainment date." *** The cited provisions,
however, do not apply "with respect to
nonattainment areas for which classifications
[and attainment dates] are specifically provided
under other provisions of [Part D of
Subchapter 1 of the Clean Air Act]." ***
The EPA argues that Subpart 2 specifically
provides classifications and attainment dates
only for nonattainment designations under the
0.12 ppm ozone NAAQS. The State and Non-
State Petitioners counter that Subpart 2
specifically provides classifications and dates
for all areas designated nonattainment under
any ozone NAAQS. We agree with the
petitioners.
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The pertinent provision of Subpart 2 reads
as follows:
(a) Classification and attainment dates for
1989 nonattainment areas. -- (1) Each area
designated non-attainment for ozone pursuant
to section 7407(d) of this title shall be classified
at the time of such designation, under table 1,
by operation of law, as a Marginal Area, a
Moderate Area, a Serious Area, a Severe Area,
or an Extreme Area....
As the petitioners note, § 107(d),
specifies three different times at which an area
can be designated "nonattainment for ozone":
immediately following enactment of the 1990
amendments, *** and when an area that was in
attainment, either when the Congress enacted
the 1990 amendments or when the EPA
promulgated a revised ozone NAAQS, later
ceases to comply ***. The petitioners conclude
from the general reference to § 107(d) that the
classifications and attainment dates in Subpart 2
apply to areas designated under 5 5 107(d)(1),
(3), and (4). The EPA gamely responds that the
reference to § 107(d) includes only subsection
(4), but we do not defer to the agency's
interpretation because we find that the
Congress has spoken on the "precise question
at issue" and we "must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."
*** We canvass the two reasons that lead us to
this conclusion before returning to the EPA's
argument.
First, the reference to § 107(d) in §
181(a)(1) appears to have been purposeful and
not the drafting error that the EPA's
interpretation implies. The Congress considered
but did not adopt bills that clearly would have
limited the reach of Subpart 2 to nonattainment
designations made immediately following
enactment of the 1990 amendments. The
Senate bill contained a version of Subpart 2 that
classified only those areas designated
nonattainment for ozone under its equivalent
of § 107(d)(4). See S. 1630, 101st Cong. § §
101, 107, reprinted in III Legislative History of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, at
4124-25, 4195 [hereinafter 1990 Legislative
History]. The version of Subpart 2 in the House
bill, as originally introduced, similarly referred
only to designations made under its equivalent
of § 107(d)(4). *** The House committee,
however, replaced the specific reference to
what is now § 107(d)(4) with a general reference
to § -107(d). *** The Conference committee
then reported the text of the House bill rather
than that of the Senate. ***
Second, our conclusion that the Congress
intentionally referred to § 107(d) as a whole is
supported by a comparison of Subparts 1 and
2. The Congress enacted Subpart 2 because of
the failure of the controls in Subpart 1 to bring
areas into attainment with the 0.12 ppm
standard in the allotted time. *** Rather than
continue treating all ozone nonattainment areas
alike, the Congress allowed the various areas
between 3 and 20 years to attain the ozone
NAAQS, depending upon the extent of the
area's ozone problem. *** As the petitioners
argue, because the 1990 amendments extended
the time for nonattainment areas to comply
with the 0.12 ppm ozone NAAQS, they must
preclude the EPA from requiring areas to
comply either more quickly or with a more
stringent ozone NAAQS.
Subpart 1 requires compliance with a
primary NAAQS "as expeditiously as
practicable, but no later than 5 years from the
date such area was designated nonattainment."
*** All nonattainment areas would have until
2012 to comply with the revised ozone
NAAQS if the EPA and the States were to take
the full time authorized in Subpart 1 for making
attainment designations and the EPA were to
approve every possible extension for each area.
*** Such wide discretion is inconsistent,
however, with Subpart 2, in which the Congress
stripped the EPA of discretion to decide which
ozone nonattainment areas should receive more
time to reach attainment (with two limited
exceptions not relevant here ***). Moreover,
under § 181 (a) of Subpart 2, Los Angeles, the
nation's only Extreme Area, has until 2010 to
attain the 0.12 ppm ozone NAAQS, and the
possibility of extending that deadline until 2012.
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That Los Angeles should also have to attain a
more stringent ozone standard by that same
year, if not earlier, clearly runs counter to the
comprehensive enforcement scheme enacted in
Subpart 2.
The EPA offers two arguments against this
interpretation of Subparts 1 and 2. First, the
EPA contends that a recent statute confirms its
power to designate nonattainment areas under
the revised ozone standard. *** That statute
also specifically states, however, that "nothing
in section[ ] ... 6103 shall be construed by the
Administrator of Environmental Protection
Agency or any court ... to affect any pending
litigation or to be a ratification of the ozone ...
standard[ ]." *** Further, even if the EPA were
correct that § 6103 confirms the agency's
power to designate areas under a revised ozone
NAAQS, that power was never in doubt, as we
concluded above. Indeed, § 6104 simply does
not bear upon the question we address here:
whether Subpart 1 or Subpart 2 provides the
applicable enforcement mechanisms for an area
designated nonattainment under a revised
ozone NAAQS.
Second, the EPA argues that read in
context the reference to § 107(d) in § 181(a)(1)
relates only to designations made under §
107(d)(4). Because the table in § 181(a)(1)
classifies areas based upon a design value that
roughly measures attainment of the 0.12 ppm
ozone NAAQS, the EPA contends that the
nonattainment designations referenced in §
181(a)(1) are only those designations made
under the 0.12 ppm ozone NAAQS. This
explanation, however, does not square with
either the Congress's decision not to refer to §
107(d)(4) specifically or the long-term nature of
the attainment scheme enacted in Subpart 2; on
the EPA's interpretation, that scheme would
have been stillborn had the EPA revised the
ozone NAAQS immediately after the Congress
enacted the 1990 amendments.
The EPA points next to § 181(b)(1), which
specifies the attainment dates for areas that met
the 0.12 ppm standard when the Congress
enacted the 1990 amendments but that later
cease to comply. That section, however, applies
only to areas designated under § 107(d)(3) that
previously were "designated attainment or
unclassifiable for ozone under section
[107(d)(4)]." That § 181(b)(1) provides special
rules for such areas, but not for areas
designated under § 107(d)(3) that had
previously been designated attainment for
ozone or unclassifiable under § 107(d)(1), does
not support the EPA's argument that the
phrase in § 181 (a)(1) "designated
nonattainment for ozone pursuant to section
107(d)" denotes only those designations made
under § 107(d)(4). If anything, the specification
of § 107(d)(4) in § 181(b)(1) makes its absence
from § 181(a)(1) all the more striking.
The final bit of context to which the EPA
points is the tide of § 181(a): "Classification and
attainment dates for 1989 nonattainment
areas." Because the title specifies "1989
nonattainment areas," we are told, § 181(a)
must refer only to nonattainment designations
made immediately after enactment of the 1990
amendments, that is, designations made under §
107(d)(4). Although "the tide of a statute or
section can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the
legislation's text," *** a title cannot be allowed
to create an ambiguity in the first place. *** The
text of § 181(a) clearly encompasses
nonattainment designations made under all
subsections of § 107(d). There simply is no
ambiguity in need of resolution by reference to
the title of the section.
In sum, § 181(a) "specifically provides" for
classifications and attainment dates for areas
designated nonattainment for ozone pursuant
to § 107(d)(1). Accordingly, Subpart 2, not
Subpart 1, provides the classifications and
attainment dates for any areas designated
nonattainment under a revised primary ozone
NAAQS, *** and the EPA must enforce any
revised primary ozone NAAQS under Subpart
2.
B. Ozone's Health Benefits
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Petitioners presented evidence that
according to them shows the health benefits of
tropospheric ozone as a shield from the
harmful effects of the sun's ultraviolet rays--
including cataracts and both melanoma and
nonmelanoma skin cancers. In estimating the
effects of ozone concentrations, EPA explicitly
disregarded these alleged benefits.
EPA explained its decision first as a matter
of statutory interpretation. Under the Clean Air
Act, EPA's ambient standards for any pollutant
are to be "based on [the] criteria" that EPA has
published for that pollutant. *** The "criteria,"
in turn, are to "reflect the latest scientific
knowledge useful in indicating the kind and
extent of all identifiable effects on public health
or welfare which may be expected from the
presence of such pollutant in the ambient air, in
varying quantities." *** The reference to "all
identifiable effects" would seem on its face to
include beneficent effects.
EPA attempts to avoid this straightforward
reading in several ways. First, it points to the
term "such pollutant," arguing that the statute
requires it to focus exclusively on the
characteristics that make the substance a
"pollutant." But the phrase "pollutant" is simply
a label used to identify a substance to be listed
and controlled by the statute. While it is
perfectly true that a substance known to be
utterly without adverse effects could not make
it onto the list, this fact of nomenclature does
not visibly manifest a congressional intent to
banish consideration of whole classes of
"identifiable effects."
EPA also relies on the fact that two of the
three specified considerations under §
108(a)(2)'s general mandate refer to "adverse
effects":
The criteria for an air pollutant, to the
extent practicable, shall include information on-
(A) those variable factors (including
atmospheric conditions) which of themselves
or in combination with other factors may alter
the effects on public health or welfare of such
air pollutant;
(B) the types of air pollutants which, when
present in the atmosphere, may interact with
such pollutant to produce an adverse effect on
public health or welfare;
and
(C) any known or anticipated adverse effects
on welfare.
*** (emphasis added). EPA's argument would
be of uncertain force even if all three types of
effects specifically required to be considered
were spoken of as "adverse effects"; there is no
reason to read "adverse" back into the "all
identifiable effects" of § 108(a)(2). But as one
of the three specified classes refers to "effects"
unmodified, *** we can reject EPA's argument
without even reaching that issue. That Congress
qualified "effects" in clauses (B) and (C) with
"adverse" seems only to strengthen the
supposition that in (A)--and in the general
mandate--it intended to cover all health or
welfare effects. Therefore if petitioners'
contentions are right, clause (A) applies to
ozone: the presence of ultraviolet radiation at
various levels "alters the effects [of ozone] on
public health or welfare" by making them on
the whole less malign--perhaps even beneficial.
Finally, EPA directs us towards legislative
history from the 1970 and 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments. The "all identifiable effects"
language, however, dates to the 1967
Amendments. Legislative history from the 1970
and 1990 Congresses cannot be "an
authoritative interpretation of what the [1967]
statute meant," because it is "the function of
the courts and not the Legislature, much less a
Committee of one House of the Legislature, to
say what an enacted statute means." ***
Under Chevron, we defer to an agency's
interpretation of a statute if "the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue"
and "the agency's answer is based on a
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permissible construction of the statute." *** We
find no such ambiguity in this case. Further,
EPA's interpretation fails even the
reasonableness standard of Chevron's second
part: it seems bizarre that a statute intended to
improve human health would, as EPA claimed
at argument, lock the agency into looking at
only one half of a substance's health effects in
determining the maximum level for that
substance. At oral argument even EPA counsel
seemed reluctant to claim that the statute
justified disregard of the beneficent effects of a
pollutant bearing directly on the health
symptoms that accounted for its being thought
a pollutant at all (suppose, for example, a
chemical that both impedes and enhances
breathing, depending on the person or
circumstances); he also seemed unable to
distinguish that case from the one here--where
the chemical evidently impedes breathing but
provides defense against various cancers.
Legally, then, EPA must consider positive
identifiable effects of a pollutant's presence in
the ambient air in formulating air quality criteria
under § 108 and NAAQS under § 109.
As we said above, we are remanding to
EPA to formulate adequate decision criteria for
its ordinary object of analysis-ill effects. We
leave it to the agency on remand to determine
whether, using the same approach as it does for
those, tropospheric ozone has a beneficent
effect, and if so, then to assess ozone's net
adverse health effect by whatever criteria it
adopts.
DISSENT:
TATEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting from Part
I:
The Clean Air Act has been on the books
for decades, has been amended by Congress
numerous times, and has been the subject of
regular congressional oversight hearings. The
Act has been parsed by this circuit no fewer
than ten times in published opinions delineating
EPA authority in the NAAQS setting process.
Yet this court now threatens to strike down
section 109 of the Act as an unconstitutional
delegation of congressional authority unless
EPA can articulate an intelligible principle
cabining its discretion. In doing so, the court
ignores the last half-century of Supreme Court
nondelegation jurisprudence, apparently
viewing these permissive precedents as mere
exceptions to the rule laid down 64 years ago in
A.LA. Schechter Poulty Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 79 L Ed. 1570, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935).
Because section 109's delegation of authority is
narrower and more principled than delegations
the Supreme Court and this court have upheld
since Schechter PoultU, and because the record in
this case demonstrates that EPA's discretion
was in fact cabined by section 109, I
respectfully dissent.
Section 109 requires EPA to publish air
quality standards "the attainment and
maintenance of which in the judgment of the
Administrator, based on such criteria and
allowing an adequate margin of safety, are
requisite to protect the public health."
Compare section 109 to the language of section
303 of the Communications Act of 1934, which
gave the FCC authority to regulate broadcast
licensing in the "public interest," and which the
Supreme Court sustained in National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26, 87 L
Ed. 1344, 63 S. Ct. 997 (1943). The FCC's
general authority to issue regulations "as public
convenence, interest, or necessity requires" was
sustained in United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178, 20 L Ed. 2d 1001, 88 S.
Ct. 1994 (1968). The Supreme Court has
sustained equally broad delegations to other
agencies, including the Price Administrator's
authority to fix "fair and equitable"
commodities prices, Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 426-27, 88 L Ed. 834, 64 S. Ct. 660
(1944), the Federal Power Commission's
authority to determine "just and reasonable"
rates, FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591, 600, 88 L Ed. 333, 64 S. Ct. 281 (1944),
the War Department's authority to recover
"excessive profits" earned on military contracts,
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Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778-786, 92
L Ed. 1694, 68 S. Ct. 1294 (1948), and the
Attorney General's authority to regulate new
drugs that pose an "imminent hazard to public
safety," Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165,
114 L Ed. 2d 219, 111 S. Ct. 1752 (1991). See
also Milk Indus. Foundation v. Glickman, 328 U.S.
App. D.C 121, 132 E.3d 1467, 1475 (D.C Cir.
1998) (upholding delegation to Secretary of
Agriculture to approve interstate compacts
upon a finding of "compelling public interest").
Given this extensive Supreme Court
precedent sustaining general congressional
delegations, no wonder the First Circuit
rejected a similar nondelegation challenge to the
Clean Air Act's "requisite to protect the public
health" language:
The power granted to EPA is not
"unconfined and vagrant". [ Scbechter Poulty, 295
U.S. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring).] The
Agency has been given a well defined task by
Congress--to reduce pollution to levels
"requisite to protect the public health", in the
case of primary standards. The Clean Air Act
outlines the approach to be followed by the
Agency and describes in detail many of its
powers.... Yet there are many benchmarks to
guide the Agency and the courts in determining
whether or not EPA is exceeding its powers,
not the least of which is that the rationality of
the means can be tested against goals capable of
fairly precise definition in the language of
science.
Administrative agencies are created by
Congress because it is impossible for the
Legislature to acquire sufficient information to
manage each detail in the long process of
extirpating the abuses identified by the
legislation; the Agency must have flexibility to
implement the congressional mandate.
Therefore, although the delegation to EPA was
a broad one, ... we have little difficulty
concluding that the delegation was not
excessive.***
I do not agree with my colleagues that
International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 291 U.S.
App. D.C 51, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C Gir. 1991)
("Lockout/Tagout F"), requires a different result.
That case remanded to OSHA for a more
precise definition of section 3(8) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, which
granted the Agency authority to enact
workplace safety standards "reasonably
necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment or places of
employment." *** The Clean Air Act does not
delegate to EPA authority to do whatever is
"reasonably necessary or appropriate" to protect
public health. Instead, the statute directs the
Agency to fashion standards that are "requisite"
to protect the public health. In other words,
EPA must set pollution standards at levels
necessaU to protect the public health, whether
"reasonable" or not, whether "appropriate" or
not.
Moreover, in setting standards "requisite to
protect the public health" EPA discretion is not
unlimited. The Clean Air Act directs EPA to
base standards on "air quality criteria" that
"accurately reflect the latest scientific
knowledge useful in indicating the kind and
extent of all identifiable effects on public health
or welfare which may be expected from the
presence of such pollutant in the ambient air, in
varying quantities." *** Indeed, the principles
constraining EPA discretion are at least as
specific as those this court sustained in
Lockout/Tagout II, i.e., that OSHA must identify
a " 'significant' safety risk, to enact a safety
standard that provides 'a high degree of worker
protection'." *** By directing EPA to set
NAAQS at levels "requisite"-not reasonably
requisite--to protect the public health with "an
adequate margin of safety," the Clean Air Act
tells EPA exactly the same thing, i.e., ensure a
high degree of protection.
Although this court's opinion might lead
one to think that section 109's language
permitted EPA to exercise unfettered discretion
in choosing NAAQS, the record shows that
EPA actually adhered to a disciplined
decisionmaking process constrained by the
statute's directive to set standards "requisite to
protect the public health" based on criteria
reflecting the "latest scientific knowledge." To
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identify which health effects were "significant
enough" to warrant protection, EPA followed
guidelines published by the American Thoracic
Society. *** It then set the ozone and fine
particle standards within ranges recommended
by CASAC, the independent scientific advisory
committee created pursuant to section 109 of
the Act. ***
CASAC must consist of at least one
member of the National Academy of Sciences,
one physician, and one person representing
state air pollution control agencies. *** In this
case, CASAC also included medical doctors,
epidemiologists, toxicologists and
environmental scientists from leading research
universities and institutions throughout the
country. EPA must explain any departures from
CASAC's recommendations. *** Bringing
scientific methods to their evaluation of the
Agency's Criteria Document and Staff Paper,
CASAC provides an objective justification for
the pollution standards the Agency selects. ***
Other federal agencies with rulemaking
responsibilities in technical fields also rely
heavily on the recommendations, policy advice,
and critical review that scientific advisory
committees provide. ***
Beginning with CASAC's ozone
recommendations--not one member
recommended going below .08 ppm--EPA gave
two perfectly rational explanations for the level
it selected. First, it set the annual level based on
the different types of health effects observed
above and below .08 ppm. Particularly below
.08, the Agency determined, "the most certain
[ozone-]related effects, while judged to be
adverse, are transdent and reversible." ***
(emphasis added). Characterizing this
explanation as saying nothing more than that
"lower exposure levels are associated with
lower risk to public health," *** my colleagues
find the Agency's reasoning unintelligible. But
EPA did not find simply that public health risks
decrease at lower levels. Instead, it found that
public health effects dfer below .08 ppm, i.e.,
that they are "transient and reversible."
Second, EPA explained that the level
should not be set below naturally occurring
background ozone concentrations. The Agency
selected .08 ppm because it found that "a 0.07
ppm level would be closer to peak background
levels that infrequently occur in some areas due
to nonanthropogenic sources of [ozone]
precursors, and thus more likely to be
inappropriately targeted in some areas on such
sources." *** Of course, any level of ozone
pollution above background concentrations is
closer to background levels than one just above
it. *** But as I read EPA's explanation, the
Agency found that peak background levels
sometimes occur at .07 ppm, not at .08 ppm.
Indeed, the data EPA provided in its
"Responses to Significant Comments" show a
range of background concentrations from a low
of .042 ppm in Olympic National Park in
Washington to a high of .075 ppm in Quachita
National Forest in Arizona. No region
registered background levels above .075 ppm.
*** In other words, by setting the annual
standard at .08 rather than .07 ppm, EPA
ensured that if a region surpasses the ozone
standard, it will do so because of controllable
human activity, not because of uncontrollable
natural levels of ozone.
A final point. Unlike OSHA, which
Lockout/Tagout I recognized has authority to
reach into every workplace to dictate what is
safe, to impose extensive civil and criminal
penalties, and "to decide which firms will live
and which will die," Lockout/ Tagout I, *** EPA
regulates primarily by setting standards for
states to develop their own plans. *** Indeed,
because states have three years to submit
implementation plans, which are themselves
subject to notice, comment, public hearing, and
frequent renegotiation, we will not know for
years precisely how the ozone and particle
NAAQS will actually affect individual
businesses. Only if a state fails to produce an
acceptable plan can EPA terminate federal
highway funds or impose its own
implementation plan. Because the Clean Air
Act gives politically accountable state
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governments primary responsibility for
determining how to distribute the burdens of
pollution reduction and therefore how the
NAAQS will affect specific industries and
individual businesses, courts have less reason to
second-guess the specificity of the
congressional delegation. Moreover, if the
states disagree with the standards EPA has set,
they have 535 representatives in Congress to
turn to for help. In fact, legislation to overturn
the very NAAQS at issue in this case was
introduced in the last Congress. ***
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COURT TO HEAR CLEAN AIR TEST OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
The New York Times
Tuesday, May 23, 2000
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court agreed today to hear a
-clean air case that casts a constitutional shadow
over the ability of federal agencies to administer
programs within broad grants of authority from
Congress.
In its appeal of a ruling overturning two
major clean air standards, the Clinton
administration said the decision last May by a
three-judge panel of the federal appeals court
here was a "radical departure from settled law"
that raised "issues of extraordinary
governmental concern."
The appeal, to be argued next fall, has the
potential to be not only one of the most
important cases on the court's docket for its
next term, but also one of the most important
cases in decades about the allocation of
authority in the modern administrative state.
In invalidating new standards that the
Environmental Protection Agency adopted in
1997 for ozone and small airborne particles, the
appeals court held that the Clean Air Act, as
interpreted by the agency, provided so little
guidance as to amount to an unconstitutional
delegation of law-making authority by
Congress. The 2-to-1 decision was the first time
that a federal regulatory program had been
struck down under the "nondelegation
doctrine" since 1935, when the Supreme Court
invoked it to invalidate two New Deal
programs.
Since then, led by the Supreme Court in its
post-New Deal stance toward agency
discretion, federal courts have generally
deferred to administrative agencies'
interpretations of their authority under their
governing statutes, many of which are as open-
ended as the Clean Air Act, if not more so.
The Clean Air Act, which dates to 1970,
directs the Environmental Protection Agency
to set national air quality standards at levels that
"in the judgment of the administrator" and
"allowing an adequate margin of safety" are
"requisite to protect the public health." If that
mandate amounts to an unconstitutional
delegation, experts in administrative law have
warned, then so do the broad marching orders
Congress has given to agencies like the Federal
Communications Commission, which is
charged with regulating broadcasting in light of
"public interest, convenience and necessity."
In striking down the clean air regulations,
the appeals court said the environmental agency
lacked "any determinate criterion for drawing
lines" and was "free to pick any point between
zero and a hair below the concentrations
yielding London's Killer Fog," a reference to an
air pollution crisis that killed 4,000 people in
one week in 1952.
The nondelegation doctrine grew out of
concern for the constitutional separation of
powers, and has received expressions of
support in earlier cases from Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin
Scalia. The argument for the doctrine is that it
helps maintain political accountability by
preventing Congress from legislating in broad
generalities while avoiding responsibility for
unpopular regulations.
The ozone and small particle regulations at
issue in this case, Browner v. American
Trucking Associations, No. 99-1257, were
decidedly unpopular in the business
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community, which argued before the appeals
court that the new standards would impose
huge costs on regulated industries without
proportional benefits to public health.
The Supreme Court has never ruled on
whether the Clean Air Act permits, or requires,
a cost-benefit analysis. The American Trucking
Associations, United States Chamber of
Commerce and other industry groups, while
agreeing with the Clinton administration that
the court should hear the administration's
appeal, have filed a separate appeal urging the
justices to adopt a cost-benefit interpretation of
the statute.
The court did not act today on that separate
appeal, which evidently remains under active
consideration.
Even aside from the nondelegation issue,
this would be an important environmental case.
The agency tightened the existing standards for
ozone and for the first time adopted a standard
for small, sooty particles, a major component of
smog. The American Lung Association
participated in the case at the appeals court
level to defend the new standards as important
public health measures, as did the states of New
Jersey and Massachusetts.
The case pits the Northeastern states
against the Midwestern industrial states whose
emissions reach the Northeast on the prevailing
winds. In addition to Massachusetts and New
Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Maine,
Maryland, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island and Vermont have all filed or
signed briefs in support of the regulations,
while Ohio, Michigan, and West Virginia are
supporting the industry plaintiffs.
Copyright D 2000 The New York Times
Company
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CLEANER, DEADLIER AIR
Feds' Good Intentions May Make You Sick
The Washington Times
Thursday, June 01, 2000
Kenneth Smith
The story goes that the U.S. government
was fighting it out with industry over the
cleanup of a waste dump in southern New
Hampshire. Most of the work was done.
Everybody agreed the site was already clean
enough for hypothetical children playing there
to eat small amounts of dirt 70 days of the year.
But the government wanted the site clean
enough to allow children to dine on dirt there
245 days per year. Never mind that the site was
a swamp where no dirt-eating children were
likely to play. The government insisted industry
spend an extra $9.3 million to safeguard the site
for nonexistent dirt-eating children.
You can read about the case of the missing
dirt eaters in a thin 1993 volume by Stephen
Breyer, now a Supreme Court justice, titled
"Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward effective
risk regulation." Mr. Breyer's writings take on
new importance in the wake of the news that
the high court intends to consider whether the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must
weigh the costs as well as benefits of
regulations it issues under the imprimatur of
the Clean Air Act.
Although Americans make cost-benefit
decisions every day - should one risk one's life,
for example, by riding in range of a
government-mandated air bag? -it has been an
article of faith among environmentalists and
government officials that there is almost no
benefit too small, no cost too high to regulate
their way to nirvana. The Associated Press
reported that the court's decision to consider
the issue "drew gasps from environmentalists."
The New York Times said the justices had
'raised the stakes even higher" in a case already
considered one of the most important in years.
"What's at stake is a critical national program to
protect our children, the elderly and our
communities from harmful air pollution," one
environmental spokesman told the Houston
Chronicle.
At issue are regulations EPA issued in 1997
to reduce smog and particulate pollution from
autos, power plants and other sources.
Reducing such emissions, the agency argued,
was consistent with its obligations to protect
the health of those who would otherwise suffer
from exposure to them. Industry officials and
three states - Michigan, Ohio and West Virginia
- sued the agency, saying, among other things,
that EPA had exceeded its authority under the
Clean Air Act: In effect, the agency was making
laws, a job that up until recently had belonged
to Congress. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia agreed with the
industry and states, and the Clinton
administration appealed the ruling to the
Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
This week it also agreed to expand its review of
the case to include the debate over the agency's
obligation to consider the costs of its good
intentions.
The press has presented this debate as one
pitting human health against corporate stock
options. How could the high court, the refrain
goes, even think of weighing the well-being of
vulnerable elderly asthmatics against industry's
bottom-line?
Not surprisingly, it's more complicated than
that. It turns out the agency was not even able
to convince its own science advisory board that
the proposal would mean improved health.
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There is, wrote the panel to EPA administrator
Carol Browner in November 1995, "no 'bright
line' which distinguishes any of the proposed
standards (either the level or the number of
allowable exceedances) as being significantly
more protective of human health."
Meanwhile, the presumed beneficiaries
would pay a price for the regulations in ways
that have nothing to do with corporate profits.
Department of Energy (DOE) officials
testified, and EPA did not dispute them, that
reducing smog concentrations would increase
human exposure to harmful ultraviolet-B
radiation now blocked by the smog. That
increase could generate up to 50 additional
melanoma-related fatalities, 11,000 new cases of
melanoma and 28,000 more cases of cataracts -
each year - said DOE.
In "Breaking the Vicious Circle," Mr.
Breyer warned of a less visible cost to
regulations: Insofar as they reduce job creation,
paychecks and, yes, company bottom-lines,
government rules may reduce overall health."
Deprivation of real income itself has adverse
health effects, in the form of poorer diet, and
more heart attacks," he wrote. A public interest
research group at George Mason University,
the Mercatus Center, says that by that standard,
EPA's rule could cause an additional 6,500
deaths annually, not including the melanoma
deaths.
EPA doesn't have to consider costs like
those, according to its interpretation of the law;
it's free to use imaginary science to protect
imaginary beneficiaries, including those who eat
dirt 245 days a year. Arguments before the high
court should be a good opportunity for Justice
Breyer and others to concentrate the agency's
mind on the real costs of its regulations to real
people.
Copyright C 2000 News World
Communications, Inc.
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SUPREME COURT TO RULE ON CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EPA CLEAN-AIR
RULES
Regulations would gready reduce human exposure to ground-level ozone
The Baltimore Sun
Tuesday, May 23, 2000
Lyle Denniston
WASHINGTON - The government's
authority to cut back on two high-risk types
of air pollution - smog and soot - has been
stymied for months by legal doubt, and
yesterday the Supreme Court stepped in to
resolve the issue.
In a brief order, the court said it would
rule within the next year on the
constitutionality of federal Clean Air Act
regulations that would sharply reduce human
exposure to ground-level ozone, a major
component of smog, and to fine particles of
soot.
Those rules, issued by the Environmental
Protection Agency, were struck down by a
federal appeals court 17 months ago. The
EPA said that ruling stripped it of much of its
ability to implement the Clean Air Act.
The agency issued the rulings on the basis
of what it said was new evidence that those
two forms of pollution pose a more serious
hazard to people than had been previously
thought. It considers the smog and soot
pollutants to be causes of the kind of dirty air
that, in summer months, leads to "red alerts"
because of the threat to human lungs.
Though the EPA said there might be
reason to cut to zero the amount of exposure
to smog and soot it should permit for people,
it did not go that far. But it sought to put
tighter limits on exposure by reducing the
amount allowed and by requiring the
improved air quality to be maintained for an
eight-hour period instead of the former one-
hour period. If a community cannot meet the
eight- hour standard, it would have to take
steps to do so.
Prolonged exposure, the agency found,
poses a significantly greater health hazard.
Court of Appeals ruling
The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia nullified only the 1997
regulations, but the court's ruling was a
sweeping denunciation of the EPA for
claiming more power than Congress had given
it to police air quality.
Appealing to the Supreme Court, the
Justice Department said the appeals court
ruling "presents an issue of immense practical
importance to the health of the American
public." It accused the appeals court of
making a "radical departure" from Supreme
Court rulings on when Congress' legislative
power has been unconstitutionally delegated
to a government agency.
The Supreme Court, the justice
Department appeal said, has upheld far
broader grants of authority than the one in
the Clean Air Act at issue in the dispute.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
commenting on the court's agreement to hear
the case, said that "once and for all, the
Supreme Court can put an end to EPA's
unconstitutional attempt to extend their
regulatory power."
The American Lung Association said,
however, that the EPA had ample authority to
interpret the Clean Air Act as it did. The
standards the EPA fashioned, the lung
association said, "are essential to protecting
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the health of millions of Americans, especially
children, the elderly and those with lung and
heart disease."
In agreeing to hear the EPA's appeal, the
justices took no action on five separate
appeals by states, health advocacy groups, and
business organizations. Those groups had
raised a variety of issues about EPA authority
to set standards for air quality.
Thus, the coming ruling appears likely to
be confined to the constitutional issue of the
EPA's authority to interpret the Clean Air Act
broadly enough to gain wide discretion in
setting air quality standards.
Copyright ( 2000 The Baltimore Sun
Company
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